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Preface
This FAC Working Paper is part of the first phase of a collab-
orative research project of the Science, Technology and 
Innovation (STI) Theme of the Future Agricultures 
Consortium (FAC). It was funded through a grant from 
the UK Department for International Development 
(DFID). The project explored the political economy of 
cereal seed systems across five distinct country contexts 
– Ethiopia, Kenya, Malawi, Ghana and Zimbabwe – during 
2009-10. The evolution of seed research and develop-
ment programmes and processes has varied greatly 
across these countries. In each case, a unique set of public 
and private actors and interests has been involved in 
defining priorities in seed policy and implementing proj-
ects, each seeking to influence those agendas to their 
advantage. Moreover, each country has a different reli-
ance on ‘modern’ hybrid (or sometimes biotech) varieties 
and associated R&D and supply systems and an inde-
pendent informal sector, involving networks of farmer 
experimenters and seed bulkers and suppliers, with 
varying degrees of capacity and .
As calls for a ‘Uniquely African Green Revolution’ gain 
momentum, the focus on seeds and seed systems is rising 
up the agricultural policy agenda. Much of the debate 
stresses the technological or market dimensions, with 
substantial investments being made in seed improve-
ment and the development of both public and private 
sector delivery systems. But there is currently much less 
emphasis on the wider policy dimensions – and particu-
larly the political economy of policymaking in these 
diverse agricultural contexts.
Experience tells us it is these factors that often make 
or break even the best designed and most well inten-
tioned intervention. And since investment in seed 
improvement and supply was last emphasised as a major 
priority in agriculture (in the 1970s and 80s), contexts 
have changed dramatically. The collapse of national 
public sector breeding systems has been dramatic, and 
this has only partially been compensated for by the selec-
tive entry of the private sector. Large multinational seed 
and agricultural supply companies are increasingly domi-
nating the global scene, and there are many claims made 
about the promises of new technologies (notably trans-
genics) transforming the seed sector through a techno-
logical revolution. While informal breeding and seed 
supply systems continue to exist, and indeed have been 
extensively supported through NGOs and other civil 
society groups, they are often under pressure, as drought, 
corruption and conflict take their toll and economic 
transformation and livelihood change continues apace, 
or they are ignored or excluded from policy circles.
The focus on cereal seed systems allowed this project 
to concentrate on a similar set of crops across the five 
study countries with a key influence on food security at 
household and national levels. Given the political rever-
berations of the ‘food crisis’ of 2007-08, this enabled 
timely analysis of the implications of the policy processes 
shaping the breeding, production, marketing and distri-
bution of cereal seeds. As this FAC Working Paper shows, 
whether grown for local subsistence or traded commer-
cially, the significance of cereal crops to national politics 
(and therefore arguments about food security and sover-
eignty), commercial interests and local livelihoods is 
profound.
To gain clear insights into the policy actors, networks, 
interests and narratives at play, this project sought to 
test the hypothesis that contrasting politics and different 
configurations of interests will affect the way cereal seed 
systems operate and shape how a ‘New Green Revolution’ 
will ultimately play out. As such, the five country studies 
analysed their respective national seed policy processes 
by asking:
 • How do seed policies get created, and by whom? 
 • How do ideas about what makes a ‘good seed policy’ 
change over time?
 • How are boundaries drawn around seed problems and 
policy ‘storylines’ elaborated? 
 • Whose voices are taken into account in the seed policy 
process? And whose are excluded? 
 • What spaces exist for new ideas, actors and networks? 
How can these be opened up?
The underlying implication in all these cases is that 
politics matter and that by engaging critically with seed 
policy processes, we can begin to define and then delib-
erate among different framings and interests to shift the 
focus of the debate beyond the usual technical/market 
fix.
John Thompson and Ian Scoones, Project Co-ordinators 
(August 2010)
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1. Abstract
This paper presents the political and economic processes 
governing Ethiopian cereal seed systems by analysing 
the overall policy context, as well as the main interests 
driving seed policy formulation and implementation and 
the roles and interaction of the different public and 
private actors. It also examines how these interests and 
interactions are related to the performance of the system 
on the ground. The nature of the Ethiopian agricultural 
sector, the historical evolution of the seed system and 
the seed specificities for each cereal crops has resulted 
in a wide range of actors with diverse linkages and policy 
processes. The analysis of these processes has identified 
a number of constraints faced by the Ethiopian cereal 
seed system. These constraints are a result of a economic 
and political drivers, including top-down state driven 
initiatives, agricultural liberalisation and the private 
sector and political-administrative decentralisation, all 
of which pull in different directions. While contrasting 
interests in federal and decentralised state level activities 
exist, ultimately it is the state-driven imperatives that 
define what private sector activity is possible. Centrally-
directed, state-supported efforts, including numerous 
campaigns, special projects and programmes along with 
ad hoc crash programmes, create numerous blockages 
in the supply and distribution of seed. These ‘pull-push’ 
factors have brought about severe strains within the 
system. Thus, it is important that the technocrats, politi-
cians, international donors and supporters understand 
these political economic drivers of change in the 
Ethiopian cereal seed system. By addressing these 
conflicts and contradictions, they may improve their 
chances of designing and implementing more technically 
effective and socially appropriate policies. This in turn 
will help establish a vibrant seed system which offers 
real choices for farmers in terms of seed type, quantity, 
and quality and delivery time at reasonable prices.
2. Introduction
This paper is concerned with understanding the political 
and economic processes governing Ethiopian cereal seed 
systems. It does this by analysing the overall policy 
context, along with the main interests driving seed policy 
formulation and implementation and the roles and inter-
action of the different public and private actors. It also 
examines how these interests and interactions are related 
to the performance of the system on the ground. 
By focusing on three key political economic drivers of 
change within the seed system – state control, market 
liberalisation and decentralisation - the paper tries to 
answer: (i) How are seed related policies and implemen-
tation guidelines are created? (ii) How do ideas about 
what makes a ‘good’ policy and implementation guide-
lines evolve and change over time? (iii) Whose voices 
and views are taken into account in the policy processes? 
(iv) What are the key arguments for the choice of actions? 
(v) What spaces exist for new ideas, actors, and networks, 
and how can these be opened up? and finally, (vi) What 
urgent national/regional seed policy issues and processes 
need to be considered for creation of vibrant seed system 
in the country?
Along with the establishment of the formal agricultural 
research system in late 1950s, the formal seed system in 
Ethiopia started with public sector support mainly 
targeting the then state owned farms. Even following 
the era of market liberalisation in the early 1990s, the 
formal seed system is still dominated by the public sector 
even though different actors, including the private sector, 
with different incentives and motives are playing increas-
ingly important roles. The decentralisation of the political 
system together with the intent of establishing a decen-
tralised seed system, the existing policy support to and 
emergence of the private sector in the seed system, and 
the associated political will and efforts to fill the huge 
rift between demand and supply are the main issues 
that necessitate better understanding of the political 
economy of the Ethiopian seed system, in order to 
improve the design and implementation of interventions 
for further strengthening the still embryonic system and 
creating a vibrant seed sector in the country. 
The seed sector is of paramount importance to 
Ethiopia, where the state pursues an Agricultural 
Development Led Industrialisation (ADLI) strategy, the 
agricultural sector plays a dominant role in the economy, 
representing about 45 percent of GDP and 85 percent 
of export earnings, and where the livelihoods of 85 
percent of the population of 79 million people are based 
on agriculture. Therefore, one can associate the growth 
in the agricultural sector directly or indirectly with the 
overall performance of the wider economy of the country. 
The real GDP for Ethiopia has risen by 48 percent, in real 
terms since 2002/03 and this economic growth has been 
strongly associated with the good performance of the 
agricultural sector, particularly from 2004  (FAO and WFP 
2008). Even though different sources give different 
reasons for this growth, area expansion along with the 
increasing trend in input use (mainly improved seeds, 
fertiliser and other agro-chemicals) are commonly cited 
contributing factors (FAO and WFP 2008; Tadesse 2008; 
Byerlee et al. 2007). 
In recent years, there has been a growing recognition 
in some policy circles of the existence of agricultural 
technologies that can considerably improve productivity 
and the limited access of these technologies to farmers. 
In addition, there is a substantial improvement in the 
level of farmers’ awareness about the use of those 
improved technologies. With considerable variability 
among the different crops, the total supply of improved 
seed in the country was only 27percent of the officially 
estimated demand in 2005 (Byerlee et al. 2007; Alemu 
and Spielman 2006). The supply still is far below the 
increasing demand even though there are a many efforts 
under way aimed at increasing production and distribu-
tion by strengthening the public and private sectors and 
also promoting community-based seed systems. 
Through analysis of the history and evolution of the 
Ethiopian agriculture sector, particularly the formal seed 
system, along with the specifics of the key cereal crops, 
the prevailing seed policies and politics, and the actors, 
decisions and their linkages, this paper identifies three 
political economic drivers that affect the way seed policy 
is played out in Ethiopia. These centre on: (i) the central 
role of the public sector in maintaining strategic control 
over the seed sector through top-down, state-led 
Working Paper 017 www.future-agricultures.org2
initiatives and coordination; (ii) the policy consequences 
of economic liberalisation and the opening up of the 
seed sector to private actors; and (iii) the challenges and 
opportunities associated with decentralised political 
administration and efforts to established a truly decen-
tralised seed system.  The analysis was based on the 
information generated from secondary data sources and 
from primary key informant interviews from a diverse 
group of actors in the system, including farmers, 
researchers, experts at Ethiopian Seed Enterprise (ESE) 
and regional seed enterprises, as well as the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Rural Development (MoARD) and the 
Bureau of Agriculture and Rural Development (BoARD). 
The reminder of the paper is organised into seven 
major sections.  In the first section, the nature of the 
Ethiopian agricultural sector and the current seed system 
is presented. The second section examines the specifics 
of the different cereal crops related with their respective 
seed system. Historical perspectives on policies and poli-
tics of the seed system in Ethiopia are presented in section 
three, while section four documents the structure, deci-
sions and linkages of the seed system with a focus on 
interests and networks. Section five depicts the federal 
and regional cereal seed system structure, identifying 
the actors, decisions and linkages within.  Finally, section 
six examines the political economic drivers in some detail, 
while the concluding section synthesises the overall 
political economy of the cereal seed system in the country 
and sets out some policy implications.
3. The nature of Ethiopian 
agriculture and seed 
systems
In the dominant subsistence and crop-livestock mixed 
farming system of Ethiopian agriculture, cereals play a 
dominant role. According to the Central Statistical 
Agency of Ethiopia  CSA (2009) estimates, about 12 
million smallholder farmers1  are engaged in the produc-
tion of cereal crops in the 2008/09 production season 
and cereals covered 78.23 percent (8.8 million hectares) 
of the total grain crop area. Among cereal crops, teff, 
maize, wheat and sorghum are important dominant 
(Table 1).
The informal seed system under Ethiopian context is 
defined as seed production and distribution along with 
the different actors where there is no legal certification 
in the process. This includes retained seed by farmers, 
farmer-to-farm seed exchange, cooperative based seed 
multiplication and distribution, NGO based seed 
multiplication and distribution etc. The formal seed 
system on the other hand is a system that involves the 
production and distribution of basic seed mainly by the 
research system or certified multipliers (like ESE, the 
regional seed Enterprises and also recently licensed 
private seed companies like ANO and Agri-Ceft Ethiopia) 
and the production and distribution of certified seed 
along with all actors involved in the production, 
marketing and regulation. 
 Overall, the dominant portion of seeds used is local 
seeds from the informal sector. During the 2008 main 
meher growing season, it is estimated that at least 95 
percent of all seeds used were local seeds carried over 
from the previous harvest either by the farmers them-
selves (through the traditional on-farm selection process 
whereby the farmer identifies next year’s seed stock while 
it is still maturing in the field and gives it special protec-
tion) or by buying from preferred seed stock kept by 
other farmers in the same locality (FAO and WFP 2009). 
The average contribution of the formal seed sector as a 
percentage of land covered by seeds from the formal 
sector is 4.31 percent with considerable variability among 
different crops in 2008 production season (NSPDC 2009). 
In the same year, about 5.24 percent for cereals, 0.71 
percent for pulses, 0.54 percent for oilseed crops was 
covered with improved seed. Among the major cereals, 
18.98 percent of the maize area, 6.37 percent of the wheat 
area and 0.85 percent of teff areas was covered with seed 
from the formal sectors (ibid). Even though, the formal 
sector is a small component of the seed systems it plays 
as an important role in disseminating improved varieties 
of different crops along with increased productivity. 
Much of the politics around cereal system seeds revolves 
around the formal seed sector, as it is assumed to be the 
sector which will narrow the gap in productivity levels 
between the current (~12 quintals/ha for cereals) and 
the potential productivity levels (~30 quintals/ha for 
cereals). As the informal sector does not have as much 
political attention, this paper will focus on the formal 
sector. 
4. The importance of the 
different cereal crops and 
seed system
The formal seed system in Ethiopia is dominated by few 
cereal crops mainly due to the perceived productivity 
gains, availability of improved varieties, and commercial 
interests of the different actors. The discussion below 
gives the importance of the individual cereal crops in 
Table 1. Importance of cereals in terms of area and production (2008/09 production season)
Crop
Area Production
ha in million % of grain land Qt in million % of grain production
Teff 2.5 22.13 30.28 17.69
Maize 1.8 15.77 39.32 22.97
Wheat 1.5 12.97 25.37 14.83
Sorghum 1.6 14.41 28.04 16.38
Total Cereals 8.8 78.23 144.96 84.69
Source: CSA (2009)
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terms of the trends in area allocated and productivity 
based on the Central Statistical Agency (CSA) of Ethiopia. 
Data and the detailed figures for each of these cereal 
crops in summarised in Annex Table 1. This section also 
provides details the seed related specificity of the 
different crops.
4.1. Maize
Under Ethiopian context, seed politics is dominated by 
maize, specifically hybrid maize. Policy-makers consider 
maize as a crop where huge productivity gains can be 
obtained to boost domestic production. Also, due to the 
fact that it cannot be recycled, there is huge demand by 
farmers, and all public and private seed companies are 
engaged in its multiplication creating competition 
among these actors.  The seed for OPV maize is produced 
by the Ethiopian Seed Enterprise (ESE) only in limited 
volume whereas the seed for hybrid maize is produced 
by both the public and private sector.
The demand for hybrid maize under Ethiopian agri-
cultural production system is very variable due to the 
agro-ecological diversity with considerable dependence 
on weather conditions. It is at the start of the production 
season that the farmers decide what type of crop variety 
seed they would like to use even though, the revealed 
demand may have been something else. If the rains come 
a bit late they usually shift to early maturing varieties, 
which may not be available as the seed for such type of 
varieties may not be multiplied. Thus, they will opt for 
local low yielding varieties even though there are better 
yielding early maturing varieties in the hands of the NARS 
(Alemu et al. 2008). For instance, during the 2008/09 
production season, when the demand for hybrid maize 
was covered by less than 30 percent, there was certified 
hybrid maize seed leftover mainly in the Rift Valley area
Overall, the area allocated and the productivity level 
of maize has been increasing since 1994. The area allo-
cated in 1994 was about one million ha, which has 
increased to about 1.8 million ha of land in 2008. Similarly, 
the average national productivity of maize has increased 
from about 15 qt/ha in 1994 to about 22 qt/ha in 2008/09 
mainly due to the strong public push of improved seed 
and fertilizer (CSA 1994; 2009). Policy makers believe this 
average cane be increased to 80 quintals/ha if improved 
hybrid varieties along with the recommended agronomic 
practices are applied. In the major maize producing areas 
(East and West Wollega and East and West Gojjam), the 
average productivity levels under farmers’ condition 
ranges from 60 to 90 quintals/ha due to better use of 
hybrid maize varieties and associated inputs (MoARD 
2009).
4.2. Wheat
Wheat is another key staple crop in Ethiopia, as well as 
a source of input for the expanding food industry in the 
country. The improved varieties have the required quali-
ties for bread and pasta making, which is expected to 
boost their marketability. Even though, there is no data 
on the proportion of wheat area allocated for durum and 
bread wheat, the demand for the two is increasing in a 
similar manner due to the expansion of bread floor and 
pasta making factories in the country.
 The seed of the improved varieties for both bread and 
durum wheat is produced by the ESE and also recently 
by the regional seed enterprises. Farmers normally prac-
tice recycling of wheat seed ranging from 3 to 5 years.
As a result of its potential marketability wheat produc-
tion has expanded from about 0.8 million ha in 1994 to 
about 1.5 million ha in 2008. Similarly, the average nation 
yield has increased consistently from about 13 quintals/ 
ha in 1994 to about 17 quintals/ha in 2008 (CSA 1994 - 
2009). The improved varieties can give up to 60 quintals/
ha under farmers’ fields with appropriate agronomic 
practices (MoARD 2008a).
4.3. Teff
Teff (Eragrostis tef ) is a significant crop in Ethiopiam 
where its production exceeds that of most other cereals. 
The word teff comes from the Amharic language meaning 
‘lost’, a reference to the fact that the grains are so small 
that dropped grains will be impossible to find. The fine 
grains grow on long, delicate stems of an annual grass 
in the lovegrass group, the genus Eragrostis. The grains 
of teff are in fact so small that enough seeds to sow an 
entire field can easily be held in the hand or in a small 
bag, making teff an extremely portable crop. 
Teff can be grown across a range of agroecological 
regions, from intermediate to lowland areas. Due to teff’s 
unique quality in making gluten-free bread and the 
increasing demand in the international market, increased 
productivity has become a priority. 
The seed of teff is generally multiplied by research 
centres and Ethiopian Seed Enterprise. In addition, it is 
multiplied by cooperative unions and their respective 
member primary cooperatives in addition to farmers’ 
tradition multiplication and farmer-to-farmer exchange. 
As in the case of wheat, the seed of the improved varieties 
for teff is produced by the ESE and more recently by the 
regional seed enterprises as well. Farmers normally prac-
tice recycling of teff seed for more than 3 years.
The area allocated for teff has increased from 1.8 
million ha in 1994 to about 2.5 million ha in 2008. The 
national average yield has also increased from 7 quintals/
ha to about 12 quintals/ha during the same period (CSA 
1994 - 2009).  The use of improved teff varieties along 
with the agronomic recommendation is believed to 
increase its productivity from the national average yield 
of about 12 quintals/ha to 20 quintals/ha (CSA 2009; 
MoARD 2008a). 
4.4. Barley
Both the food and malt barley are produced in the 
country. Recently, the demand for malt barley is increasing 
considerably due to the expansion of brewery factories 
in the country, replacing the food barley. An example of 
the private sector financing research is observed with 
malt barley, where the Assela Malt Factory has started 
funding the research and extension programme of the 
national barley research programme at Kulumsa Research 
Centre.  The seed of improved malt barley are distributed 
by ESE and regional seed enterprises. In addition, the 
national barely research programme is extensively 
promoting the varieties by linking farmers with the Malt 
factory through cooperatives. 
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Even though, the increase in the area allocated in not 
high (about 1 million ha in 2008), the average national 
yield increase is considerable: from about 10 quintals/
ha in 1994 to about 16 quintals/ha in 2008 (CSA 1994, 
2009).
4.5. Sorghum
The unique characteristic of sorghum is that it is 
commonly grown in drought prone and food insecure 
areas like Wello, Hararghe, and Somali areas. This implies 
the important role of sorghum seed system in addressing 
the food security issues in drought prone areas.
Sorghum seed multiplication is very limited and 
farmers dominantly use their local varieties. However, 
due to the serious impact of both biotic and abiotic 
stresses, including water stress and striga problem on 
the production and productivity of the crop, the demand 
for recently released tolerant varieties is increasing 
considerably. 
The seed of improved sorghum varieties are mainly 
produced by ESE in limited amount. Project based 
sorghum seed production and dissemination is also 
undertaken by NARS mainly for drought and striga 
tolerant varieties. The recently released hybrid sorghum 
varieties are not yet multiplied by any seed producers. 
However, if the demand for them is created, both the 
public and private seed companies are expected to be 
involved in their seed production.
The area allocated for sorghum has increased from 
about 0.9 million ha in 1994 to about 1.6 million ha in 
2008. Similarly, the average yield has increased from 
about 13 quintals/ha in 1994 to about 17 quintals/ha in 
2008 (CSA 1994 - 2009). 
4.6. Millet
Millet is a traditional crop dominantly produced using 
local varieties. It is mainly characterized for its drought 
tolerance and the ability to store for long period of time 
due to its resistance to storage pests. The seed of 
improved millet varieties is not multiplied by the formal 
sector but it is promoted by NARS. The total area allocated 
for millet has doubled from about 0.2 million ha in 1994 
to about 0.4 million ha in 2008. However, the national 
average productivity, which is about 30 quintals /ha, has 
not changed over the last decade (CSA 1994 - 2009). ] 
4.7. Rice
Rice is a recent introduction to Ethiopia with huge poten-
tial. A recent National Rice R&D Strategy estimates the 
potential to be about 1.3 million ha (0.8 million for rain-
fed and 0.5 million for irrigated rice). Based on CSA esti-
mates, the rice area has increased from 8,365 ha in 2000 
to 35,088 ha in 2008 with a average yield increase from 
about 18 quintals/ ha to 20 quintal/ha, respectively (CSA 
1994-2009;  2009). However, the existing varieties with 
the recommended practice can give more than 60 quin-
tals / ha under farmers’ condition.
The rice seed was under multiplication by ESE and 
also regional seed enterprises in 2009 production season. 
Similarly, farmers-based rice seed multiplication is 
promoted by SG 2000 and JICA Ethiopia. Considering 
the declaration of rice by the government as the 
’Millennium’ crop, its seed system will get due emphasis 
along with the implementation of the just crafted 
National Rice Research and Development Strategy 
(MoARD 2010).
4.8. The strategic importance of cereal 
seeds 
The Ethiopian agriculture sector is central to the country’s 
economy, and all cereals are of strategic importance. 
Given the challenges of feeding a growing population 
and the need to boost revenues from the agricultural 
sector, it is no surprise that the government sees 
increasing production as a major priority. This means 
seeds and politics are intimately intertwined. 
As the next section shows, this has long been the case, 
but in the last decades this has taken on a new character. 
Since the late 1980s, and particularly following the estab-
lishment of the new Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary 
Democratic Front (EPRDF) led government in 1991, there 
have been attempts to liberalise the economy, including 
the agriculture sector. This period has also coincided with 
a major decentralisation process, with regions having 
autonomy in a range of areas including agricultural and 
food policy. However, this dual process of economic 
liberalisation and political-administrative decentralisa-
tion process has highlighted some of the major tensions 
in policy making in Ethiopia. In particular this has been 
between state control and centralised direction and 
private entrepreneurship and decentralised approaches. 
In the following sections therefore the paper will 
explore the historical evolution of policies, as well as their 
current institutional configurations and political 
economic significance.
5. The Ethiopian cereal seed 
system: policies and politics
5.1. History and evolution of the Ethiopian 
seed sector
The historical evolution of the formal seed system has a 
direct impact in the design and implementation of seed 
policies, in terms of institutional setup, type of actors 
and way of regulation and enforcement. At the early 
stage, the Ethiopian seed system, dominated by selected 
cereal crops, was run by the then higher learning insti-
tutes, namely Ambo Agricultural School in the late 1930s, 
Jimma Agricultural Technical School in 1942, and Alemaya 
College of Agriculture (now Haramaya University) in 1954. 
With the growing understanding of having formal agri-
cultural research system, the then Institute of Agricultural 
Research now Ethiopian Institute of Agricultural Research 
(EIAR), joined the system in 1966. During this phase, the 
production and distribution of seed was not coordinated 
(Zewdie et al. 2008).
During the Derg regime (1975-1987), the need for 
nationally coordinated seed production and distribution 
was realised especially to fulfil the seed demand of the 
expanding state farms and emerging Agricultural 
Producers’ Cooperatives, which lead to the establishment 
of the National Crop Improvement Committee (NCIC) in 
1976. The NCIC then setup the National Seed Council 
(NSC) to formulate recommendations for the production 
and supply of released variety seeds, which led to the 
establishment of the Ethiopian Seed Corporation (ESC) 
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in 1979 (now called Ethiopian Seed Enterprise) and insti-
tutionalized seed production, processing, distribution 
and quality control of improved varieties of cereals, 
legumes and oilseed crops. In addition, the NCIC had 
handled the responsibility of variety release and registry 
until the establishment of the National Variety Release 
Committee (NVRC) in 1982 (Belay 2002). The NVRC is still 
functional and performs the coordination and the evalu-
ation of variety verification trials and suggestion for 
release approval but the approval and registration is the 
responsibility of the Animal and Plant Health Regulatory 
Directorate of the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural 
Development (MoARD).
The current Government of Ethiopia has also realised 
the importance of further strengthening the seed system 
and established a National Seed Industry Agency (NSIA) 
in 1993 along with a National Fertiliser Industry Agency 
(NFIA) with the support of International Development 
Association (IDA) and International Fund for Agricultural 
Development (IFAD) Seed System Development Project. 
For creation of institutional synergy, the NSIA and NFIA 
were merged in 2003 and established the National 
Agricultural Input Authority (NAIA), which was functional 
only for about one year (Alemu et al. 2008).  In 2004, the 
NAIA was integrated to the Agricultural Input Quality 
Control and Inspection Department and the Agricultural 
Input Market Department of the Ministry of Agriculture 
and Rural Development (MoARD), which has continued 
after the institutional transformation in early 2006 (after 
the Business Process Re-engineering-BPR) even though 
the names has changed namely, Animal and Plant Health 
Regulatory Directorate and Agricultural Marketing 
Directorate of MoARD (MoARD  2008c).
Today, the Ethiopian seed sector is governed by poli-
cies stipulated in the different public proclamations and 
regulations that were put in place since the early 1990s. 
These are Proclamation No. 56/1993 passed for the estab-
lishment of NSIA, the Seed Regulation No. 16/1997, which 
was amended in 2000 by Proclamation No. 206/2000, 
the Plant Protection Decree (No. 56/1971), the Plant 
Quarantine Regulation (No. 4/1992), the Plant Breeders’ 
Rights Proclamation (No. 481/2006), and Access to 
Genetic Resources and Community Knowledge and 
Community Rights Proclamation (No. 482/2006). The 
national seed proclamation no 206/2000 is very specific 
to the seed sector as it stipulates (i) the creation of a legal 
framework for the interests of all actors in the system, 
(ii) designating government agencies which support, 
advise and control individuals or organisations engaged 
in the production and marketing of seed, and (iii) 
supporting the use of quality seed through a smooth, 
effective and quick supply system (Bishaw et al. 2008)
In addition, proclamations and regulations put in place 
to govern other public organisations involved in the 
national formal seed system are also part of the national 
seed policies. These include Regulation No.154/1993 
passed to establish and frame the role and responsibility 
Ethiopian Seed Enterprise (ESE), Proclamation No.79/1997 
passed to establish the former Ethiopian agricultural 
research organisation (EARO), now EIAR,  Proclamation 
No.120/1998 passed to establish and frame the role and 
responsibility of the Institute of Biodiversity Conservation 
(IBC), and Proclamation No. 380/2004 passed to authorise 
MoARD to supervise all government  and non-govern-
ment organs dealing with seed production, distribution 
and regulation (ibid).
The main responsibility of implementing these policies 
is given to MoARD at the federal level and to Bureau of 
Agriculture and Rural Development BoARD at regional 
level. Overall, the main targets of the policies are related 
with: (i) streamlining evaluation, release, registration and 
maintenance of varieties developed by the National 
Agricultural Research System (NARS); (ii) developing an 
effective seed production and supply system through 
participation of public and private actors; (iii) encour-
aging the participation of farmers in germplasm conser-
vation and seed production; (iv) creating functional and 
efficient institutional linkages among seed industry 
development players; and (v) regulating seed quality, 
seed import-export trade, quarantine and other seed 
related issues.
While the formal seed system has all the elements – 
production, distribution, regulation (FDRE 2000; 2006), 
there remains a critical shortage of quality seed in 
Ethiopia. Supply nowhere matches overall potential 
demand and despite numerous programmes, led by 
donors and government alike, the uptake of improved 
seed in the Ethiopian agricultural sector remains very 
low. This inevitably constrains agricultural productivity 
and the opportunities for technology-led intensification 
which is central to the government’s policy thrust.
In the last two years, a new effort has been initiated 
by the government, led by the Minister of the MoARD, 
with the knowledge of the Prime Minister’s office. This 
is the Crash Seed Multiplication Programme (CSMP) 
(MoARD 2009). The CSMP was designed with the main 
objective of alleviating the serious supply shortage of 
improved seeds as compared to demand mainly for 
hybrid maize. It started in 2008/09 production season 
through mobilisation of all relevant public sector institu-
tions including MoARD, EIAR, ESE, and state farms in 
multiplication of hybrid maize varieties starting from 
breeder, pre-basic, basic, and certified seed, targeting 
the production of 730,000 quintals of certified hybrid 
maize seed for the 2010 production season (MoARD 
2009).  The programme is run by a National Seed 
Multiplication and Distribution Committee (NSMDC) 
composed of three members from three institutions i.e. 
from the Ethiopian Institute of Agricultural Research 
(EIAR), Ethiopian Seed Enterprise (ESE) and Agricultural 
Marketing Directorate of MoARD. The overall programme 
is overseen by the Board of ESE, the State Minister for 
Agricultural Marketing sector and by the Minister of 
MoARD.
Hybrid maize was selected due to the huge rift 
between demand and supply and the realised huge 
productivity gain if farmers use the seed. It is assumed 
that if half of maize producers achieve the productivity 
level achieved under farmers’ condition using hybrid seed 
and recommended practices, the commercial imports 
of grain could be covered by domestic production.
The specific measures undertaken in the CSMP are (i) 
assigning Bako Agricultural Research Centre, the national 
centre of excellence for maize research, to focus on the 
production of breeder and pre-basic seed, (ii) strength-
ening the capacity of relevant research centres to 
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produce breeder, pre-basic and basic seed, twice per year 
using irrigation (iii) bringing on board state farms in basic 
seed and certified seed multiplication during off-season 
and main season. Accordingly, from the planned nearly 
20,000 ha of land, about 10,000 ha was prepared for 
planting and about 37 percent of the prepared land i.e. 
6,525.23 ha was under hybrid maize seed multiplication 
using irrigation. This is expected to increase the supply 
of certified hybrid seed by threefold for the 2009/10 
planting season (MoARD 2008a).
5.2. Recent efforts to build a vibrant seed 
sector
As the previous section shows, the broad policy frame-
work for the support of a vibrant seed sector in Ethiopia 
has been established, but it has so far failed to deliver 
on the scale required. A centrally-directed initiative led 
by the federal government has attempted to deal with 
the major shortage of seed in the country, but there are 
other more structural issues to be addressed as well. 
The seed policy process is also being influenced by 
the donors and development partners who are interested 
in strengthening the national seed system through 
different programmes. These include PASS, the Program 
for Africa’s Seed System of the Alliance for a Green 
Revolution in Africa (AGRA), an initiative of the Bill & 
Melinda Gates and Rockefeller Foundations, and AGP, 
the Agricultural Growth Program of the World Bank 
(World Bank 2009), specifically targeting the Ethiopian 
seed system though technical support and investment. 
Some of these development partners are focusing on 
the issue of seed security in rain-fed agricultural systems 
associated unreliable rainfall, an area which has had 
limited attention from the public sector. 
Seed policy issues at the regional level are also being 
addressed which will have a direct bearing on Ethiopia’s 
seed sector. For example, ASARECA, the Association for 
Strengthening Agricultural Research in Eastern and 
Central Africa, which represents the National Agricultural 
Research Systems, together with the Common Market 
for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), which 
promotes regional trade and investment, is fostering the 
harmonisation of seed policies in the region. As a member 
of these regional organisations, Ethiopia has started 
reviewing the way its seed policy will be harmonised 
with those of neighbouring countries. A national 
committee for harmonisation composed of researchers 
from EIAR is participating in the regional debates and 
discussions and there is a strong belief that the Ethiopian 
Seed Growers and Processors Association (ESGPA) should 
take the lead in pushing the harmonisation together with 
the East African Seed Traders’ Association (EASTA). 
The following sections look at each element of 
Ethiopia’s seed system – from breeding and variety 
release, source seed multiplication, certified seed produc-
tion and distribution to pricing. They examine how the 
system works in practice, who is involved, what networks 
of actors are formed with what interests, where the 
bottlenecks are and what the policy challenges might 
be if the broader vision of realising a Green Revolution 
for Ethiopia is to be achieved.
6. The cereal seed system 
structure, decisions and 
linkages
The type and number of actors in the formal seed system 
in general, and cereal seed system in particular, have 
been changing along with the institutional and policy 
changes in the system. At present, the formal seed sector 
comprises the National Agricultural Research System 
(NARS), seed producers, seed distributors and regulators. 
The role of the different actors in the seed system is 
summarised in Table 2. 
6.1. Actors, decisions, and linkages in crop 
breeding, breeder and pre-basic seed 
multiplication
Under the Ethiopian context, the crop breeding, multi-
plication of breeder and pre-basic seed are the respon-
sibility of the public agricultural research, which has been 
decentralised since 1997 along with the decentralised 
political system into federal and regional research insti-
tutes. Therefore, the agricultural research agenda setting 
in general and crop breeding in particular also follows a 
decentralised decision making at a federal and regional 
level (Figure 1).
At the federal level, the Ethiopian Institute of 
Agricultural Research (EIAR) is responsible for running 
crop breeding programmes that have relevance to more 
than one region along with the national coordination of 
research to avoid redundancy of efforts. EIAR is account-
able to the federal Ministry of Agriculture and Rural 
Development (MoARD). The research agenda setting and 
funding comes from the federal government. Even the 
limited externally fund research projects have to go 
through formal approval of the Ministry of Finance and 
Economic Development (MoFED). EIAR requests each 
year for funding the federal government through MoFED, 
which goes the long process of approval through the 
Prime Minister’s office and federal parliament.
Following EIAR’s institutionalisation under the MoARD 
in 2008, research priorities have started to be discussed 
by the Federal Agricultural and Rural Development 
Partners’ Linkage Advisory Council (FARDPLAC) which is 
composed of relevant governmental, non-governmental 
and also private stakeholders involved in the sector. 
FARDPLAC meets twice a year regularly, sets priorities 
and also assigns responsibilities to the different stake-
holders for the issues that emerge each time.  The council 
serves as a platform, where major constraints are raised 
and brought to the awareness of stakeholders especially 
policy makers. 
Similarly, the Regional Agricultural Research Institutes 
(RARIs) and Agricultural Higher Learning Institutes 
(AHLIs) follow the same procedure of research agenda 
setting and funding. At present there are seven RARIs, 
namely, Tigray Agricultural Research Institute (TARI), 
Amhara Regional Agricultural Research Institute (ARARI), 
Oromiya Agricultural Research Institute (OARI), South 
Agricultural Research Institute (SARI), Afar Pastoral and 
Agro-pastoral Research Institute (APARI), Somali Pastoral 
and Agro-pastoral Research Institute (SoRARI), and 
Gambella Agricultural Research Institute (GARI). The 
AHLIs, which are currently engaged in Agricultural 
Working Paper 017 www.future-agricultures.org7
Research, are Haramaya, Mekelle, Hawasa, and Jimma 
Universities. This implies the possibility of having region-
specific crop breeding and breeder seed multiplication 
programs.
The continuous public funding of the research in 
Ethiopia makes it unique as compared to other African 
countries, which are often dependent on foreign funding. 
However, the regional government funding for most of 
the regional research institutes seems limited as most 
of these institutes still suffer from lack of skilled manpower 
and necessary facilities. The same is true with the agri-
cultural HLIs except the well established universities 
(Haramaya, Hawassa, Jimma and Mekelle). Therefore, 
much of the burden especially in the multiplication of 
pre-basic and basic seeds lies on EIAR and the three 
strong regional research institutes (OARI, ARARI and 
SARI). 
Overall, the national crop breeding programmes 
seems well funded by the public sector and there is a 
good trend in decentralisation of the research system 
along with a number of good crop varieties released. 
However the system still remains weak, mainly due to (i) 
the limited overall coordination for effective utilisation 
of research resources both human and physical among 
the different actors of the National Research System (EIAR, 
RARIs, and AHLIs), and (ii) the limited agro-ecological 
coverage of the breeding programme due to the huge 
agro-ecological diversity in the country (there are 18 
major agro-ecological zones relevant for agricultural 
production (IFPRI and CSA 2006).  
6.2. Actors, roles and linkages in cereal 
variety development, release, mainte-
nance, and promotion
6.2.1. Adaptation and generation of new cereal crop 
varieties 
The agricultural research system has been engaged in 
adaptation and generation of different improved vari-
eties for most of the cereal crops. Since the start of formal 
crop improvement programme in early 1950s, there has 
been strong exchange of cereal germplasm especially 
through a close collaboration with International 
Agricultural Research Institutes (CGIAR centres). For 
example, the Ethiopian wheat and maize improvement 
programme has been collaborating with the International 
Maize and Wheat Improvement Center (CIMMYT), which 
has resulted in release of considerable number of vari-
eties. Direct linkages with National Research Organisations 
like KARI have also helped the germplasm exchange. The 
emphasis given in the Plan for Accelerated and 
Sustainable Development to End Poverty (PASDEP) for 
importation and adaptation of technologies is in line 
with the long ago started effort in the crop improvement 
programmes (MoFED 2006).
6.2.2. Verification and evaluation of candidate 
variety and release approval
The release of candidate varieties has a formal procedure. 
Generally, the researcher(s) or importing seed company 
applies for evaluation of candidate variety either for 
national or regional release along with a report on the 
agronomic performance to the standing National  Variety 
Release Committee (NVRC) of the Animal and Plant 
Health Regulatory Directorate (APHRD) of MoARD. The 
Table 2. Major actors in the seed system and their role
Components of the seed system Institutions Regulatory bodies Regulatory measures
Plant breeding EIAR, RARIs, and HLIs MoARD Targets in terms of crop, 
improvement targets
Variety release NVRC MoARD Distinctiveness, uniformity and 
stability, uniqueness, value for 
cultivation
Breeder seed production EIAR, RARIs, and HLIs Variety 
Maintaining 
Research Centre
Seed quality control
Pre-basic seed production EIAR, RARIs, HLIs and 
ESE, OSE, ASE
Seed quality control
Basic  seed production ESE MoARD Seed quality control
Basic seed distribution and sale MoARD Fair distribution among regions
Certified seed production ESE, OSE, Private 
seed companies
MoARD Seed quality control
Farmers based seed production ESE, BoARDs, NGOs 
and farmers
BoARDs Seed quality control
Seed distribution and sales ESE, OSE, ASE, 
Co-operatives, 
BoARDs
BoARDs Price, quantity to respective 
buyers
Overall sight on the seed system National Seed 
Production and 
Distribution 
Committee
MoARD / EIAR Planned production
Fair distribution of different 
classes of seed
Source: adapted from Bishaw et al. (2008)
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NVRC committee members are senior researchers nomi-
nated from relevant research institutes mainly from EIAR, 
RARIs and AHLIs. The NVRC nominates an ad hoc technical 
committee by drawing members from different institu-
tions to report on variety performance after examining 
the data and field visits. The report covers performance 
data evaluation, field performance evaluation and recom-
mendations for the NVRC. The NVRC may release a variety 
not only on superior yield, but important characters such 
as grain colour, early maturity, etc. compared to existing 
commercial varieties. Upon the release of the new variety 
breeders will provide small quantity of seed to the 
chairman of the NVRC, who will forward it to the Institute 
of Biodiversity Conservation (IBC) for the long-term 
storage. 
The release of a variety could be national or regional 
and the approval and registration is at national level by 
the NVRC. This resulted in multiple requests for release 
at both national and regional level, especially after the 
decentralisation of the research system. Some regional 
researchers were requesting for regional release using 
germplasm under national variety trails from which a 
variety for national release is expected. In order to avoid 
such problem, the NVRC used to request the approval 
of the national commodity leader.
Even though the country has the institutional and 
policy framework for variety release and register, there 
are limitations and challenges in the system which can 
result in the release and use of poor performing varieties. 
There is limited capacity for verifying the authenticity of 
imported certified seeds to the one that is released. 
Technical committees also vary in skill and experience, 
resulting in inconsistency in the evaluation of different 
candidate varieties.  In line with this, Belay (2008) confirms 
that the evaluation and release mechanism is not very 
strict, which may result in the release of poor performing 
varieties.
Such an occurrence has been indicated by the recent 
row among farmers in West Gojjam, the Amhara BoARD, 
and a private seed company on the poor performance 
of an imported hybrid maize variety from South Africa, 
which was officially released. The farmers are demanding 
official compensation for the poor performance of their 
maize field in 2009 production season since the use of 
the variety was through the recommendation of the 
BoARD.  
6.2.3. Maintenance, demonstration and popularisa-
tion of released varieties
Once the variety is released the research centre where 
the variety was generated takes the responsibility of 
maintaining the breeder and pre-basic seed. 
Demonstration and popularisation activities are 
performed in selected target areas for creation of aware-
ness among farmers and also development partners for 
wider promotion of the released variety.
One of the major factors for the limited uptake of 
released varieties is reported to be the limited demon-
stration and popularisation of the varieties to relevant 
stakeholders including farmers and extension workers. 
Demonstration and popularisation activities are meant 
to strengthen the interface between research and devel-
opment (formal extension) within the agricultural sector. 
In general, these activities use to concentrate around 
research centres, where the varieties are generated. 
However, recently started initiatives for the pre-scaling 
up of agricultural technologies by EIAR and RARIs are 
targeted to demonstrate and popularize improved vari-
eties to less reached areas of the country. There is a need 
for these initiatives to formalised and promoted for better 
popularisation and adoption of the currently available 
improved crop varieties.  
6.3. Actors, decisions, and linkages in basic 
seed production and distribution
The list of actors and their role in the production and 
distribution of basic seed is presented in Figure 3.  Basic 
seed for cereals are produced by respective research 
centres of EIAR and RARIs, the ESE, OSE and ASE, and 
licensed private seed companies. 
Of the different cereal crops, the shortage of basic 
seed for hybrid maize has been dominating the debate 
about the seed issue in the country. Bako Agricultural 
Research centre of OARI was the only producer of basic 
Figure 1. Actors, decisions, and linkages in crop breeding, breeder and pre-basic seed multiplication
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seed for hybrid maize that were developed by the 
National Research System and the pre-basic seed was 
supplied by National Maize Project at Bako of EIAR. 
However, starting from the 2008/09 production season, 
Adet Agricultural Research centre of the Amhara Regional 
Agricultural Research Institute (ARARI) and Hawassa 
Agricultural Research Centre of the Southern Agricultural 
Research Institute (SARI) from the public sector and Agri-
Ceft Ethiopia and ANO PLC from the private sector are 
licensed for basic seed production of most of the popular 
public hybrid maize varieties. Of course, Pioneer Hi-bred 
Ethiopia, which is a multinational seed company, has its 
own hybrid maize varieties that are evaluated and 
released through the formal procedure in Ethiopia.
The procedure to get a license for the production of 
basic seed for hybrid maize includes: (i) completing an 
application to the Agricultural Marketing Directorate 
(AMD) of the MoARD, (ii) evaluation of the application 
by a team of experts from APHRD of MoARD in terms of 
the suitability of the farmland for multiplication of the 
parental lines and the human capacity, (iii) approval letter 
by the AMD of MoARD, and (iv) agreement with EIAR.
The suggested allocation of the produced basic seed 
among the different regions is one issue that has been 
decided at the state ministerial level of the Agricultural 
Marketing Sector of MoARD each year. The Board of 
Directors of ESE has an important role in suggesting the 
distribution of the produced basic seed among regions. 
Of course, the distribution to regional level is only made 
after deducting the amount required by ESE. The different 
regions then distribute the allocated basic seed to 
different programmes and actors including the private 
seed companies. 
The distribution of basic seeds produced in 2008/9 
production season has been mainly targeted for the 
public seed production due to the Crash Seed 
Multiplication Program-(CSMP) and the ’scaling-up activi-
ties’ planned by the public sector for the 2009/10 produc-
tion season. This has limited the participation of most of 
the private seed companies in hybrid seed production. 
Even though, the licensing of additional actors from both 
private and public sector for the multiplication of parental 
line is appreciable in boosting competitive supply of 
certified hybrid maize seed, the priority given to the CSMP 
in basic seed allocation seems to crowd out of the private 
seed companies from the involvement in certified hybrid 
maize seed production eroding the thrust between the 
private and public sectors.
6.4. Actors, decisions, and linkages in 
certified seed production and distribution
The interaction of the different actors in the production 
and multiplication of certified seed is depicted in Figure 
4. For simplicity, the seed producers, quality control and 
certification, and the distribution among and within 
regions are discussed below.
6.4.1. Seed Producers
Seed producers are both public and private. The public 
seed production is dominated by Ethiopian Seed 
Enterprise (ESE) and since 2008 regional seed enterprises 
(RSEs) have come into the picture, at present there are 
two RSEs, Oromiya Seed Enterprise (OSE) and Amhara 
Seed Enterprise (ASE). There are about 30 licensed private 
seed companies mainly involved in the production of 
hybrid maize seed. 
The role of cooperatives in seed multiplication is 
increasing from time to time. They are already engaged 
in seed production, cleaning and trading of Quality 
Declared Seeds2  (QDS) of OPV varieties with technical 
support from woreda BoARD.3  However, the supply of 
basic seed of adapted improved crop varieties is in 
shortage for such program.
The ESE produces certified seed through contract 
arrangement on state and private commercial farms, on 
farmers’ fields along with the production on own farms. 
Similar approach is followed by the newly established 
regional seed enterprises. It is expected that the emer-
gence of regional seed enterprises will promote the 
Figure 2. Actors, roles and linkages in cereal variety development, release, maintenance, and promotion
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production of seed for crops that are not so far produced 
through the formal system. 
An additional alternative in increasing the seed 
production capacity, the public seed enterprises are 
promoting farmers-based seed production and 
marketing schemes and considerable achievements have 
been made. For instance, the Amhara Seed Enterprise 
(ASE) has promoted Farmers’ Based Seed Multiplication 
Scheme (FBSMS) immediately after its establishment in 
early 2009 with a focus on potential areas for seed multi-
plication and clustering approach. The focus on potential 
areas helps in reducing the cost of production and also 
helps to get quality seed. The clustering helps to ease 
the management and supervision of the seed production 
process.  In general, it is estimated that about 70 percent 
of the supply of certified seed in the region was from 
FBSMS in 2009 production season. 
The arrangement of the FBSMS is that the basic seed 
is supplied by Seed Enterprises i.e. by ESE and/or regional 
seed enterprise and required training is given to partici-
pating farmers along with area selection and clustering. 
Then, the seed enterprises purchase the seed by adding 
premium prices (market price plus 15 percent). The major 
challenges in the FBSMS are the limited capacity of the 
seed enterprise both ESE and regional SE to purchase 
timely from farmers, limited capacity of facilities like 
harvesting and threshing, cleaning and grading facilities, 
and storage. Wheat, malt barley, teff and rice are the main 
cereals where FBSM is promoted.
6.4.2. Quality control and certification
The public seed enterprises (ESE, OSE, and ASE) have 
their own internal seed quality assurance system and 
thereby their own certification. However, the private seed 
companies need to have the two evaluations/verifica-
tions by respective regional Seed Quality Inspection 
Laboratory (SQIL), which are assigned by MoARD or 
BoARD. The first evaluation is made immediately after 
emergence and the second during detasseling. The issues 
considered during these evaluations/verifications are: 
(i) source of basic seed; (ii) required isolation of fields; 
(iii) crop emergence and vigour; and (iv) detasseling.  Even 
though, the SQILs are important in certifying the quality 
of seed produced, their human and physical capacity is 
very limited. There is considerable complaint by private 
seed companies for difficulty of having the SQIL to visit 
respective farms timely.
The SQILs are accountable to the Animal and Plant 
Health Regulatory Directorate (APHRD) of the particular 
regional BoARD in that area where there are such depart-
ments and directly to the BoARD. For instance, in Amhara 
region, there are four Seed Quality and Inspection 
Laboratories (SQIL) with respective mandate area. These 
are Gonder, Dur Bete, Dessie, and Debre Markos SQIL. 
These laboratories are under the supervision of the 
APHRD of the Amhara BoARD.
Based on the evaluation report from the respective 
SQILs, the Agricultural Marketing Department of respec-
tive regions issues a Seed Quality Result Certification with 
a code number of the produced seed. The seed producer 
is then mandated to put a seed tag in every bag (Tag A 
outside the bag and Tag B inside the bag) as indicators 
of certification. The Seed Reference number on the tags 
and quality certificate should be the same.
6.4.3. Distribution of certified seed
Distribution among regions: Due to the shortage of 
supply of certified seed, the allocation of the produced 
certified seed among the different regions is normally 
made by the policy makers. The most important criteria 
used for the allocation are the regional importance in 
the national production of the crop, the size of the 
revealed demand, and also regional equity. So far the 
allocation of certified seed produced by both public and 
private companies among the different regions is the 
responsibility of the Agricultural Marketing Sector of 
MoARD. 
The distribution of seed among regions is highly 
related with the size of cropped areas in the different 
regions, although some variability does exist. Table 3 
Figure 3. Actors, decisions, and linkages in basic seed production and distribution
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summarises the proportion of seed distributed among 
regions as well as the proportion of cropped areas and 
areas allocated for cereals. For instance, Oromiya’s share 
from the total cropped areas is about 45 percent and 
from area allocated for cereals is about 46 percent, which 
is similar to its total seed received. On the other hand, 
Amhara, Somali and Benishangul-Gumuz seem to get 
lower proportion and Tigray and SNNP receive a higher 
proportion as compared to their share in the total 
cropped area and area allocated for cereals. This can be 
partly explained by the variability of farmers’ demand 
for seed across the different regions, which is reflected 
in the regional demands presented each year to MoARD.
Distribution within regions: The distribution of allo-
cated certified seed to the different regions is undertaken 
through farmers’ cooperative unions and their respective 
member primary cooperatives. Each cooperative union 
is informed about the amount of certified seed allocated 
by the regional BoARD by source, i.e. the amount allo-
cated from the different seed companies including the 
private companies. Similarly, the seed companies are 
informed to which cooperative union they should submit 
the produced certified seed. Each union and primary 
cooperative is attached to a respective zone and woreda 
as their mandate area of service provision. Therefore, the 
unions work closely with zonal BoARD and the primary 
cooperatives with woreda  BoARD and kebele 
administration.4
The primary cooperatives distribute seeds to farmers. 
While seeds in ample supply are given to any interested 
Figure 4. Actors, decisions, and linkages in certified seed production and distribution
Table 3. Regional distribution of 2007/08 produced seed and cropped area
Regions
Crop area (2007/08 
production season)
Cereal area (2007/08 
production season)
Produced Seed distribu-
tion(2007/08 production season)
ha % Ha % quintals %
Ethiopia 11,210,501.00 100.00 8,770,118.00 100.00 257,075.00 100.00 
Oromiya 5,073,271.00 45.25 4,064,069.00 46.34 118,488 46.09 
Amhara 3,973,611.00 35.45 2,959,084.00 33.74 56,678 22.05 
SNNP 964,379.20 8.60 785,304.40 8.95 31,449 12.23 
Tigray 885,835.10 7.90 707,376.40 8.07 28,047 10.91 
Afar 17,423.26 0.16 16,714.64 0.19 42 0.02 
Harari 10,166.34 0.09 8,021.33 0.09 50 0.02 
Addis Ababa 128 0.05 
Somali 75,142.24 0.67 72,451.94 0.83 777 0.30 
Dire Dawa 7,908.71 0.07 7,406.07 0.08 170 0.07 
Benishangul 
Gumuz
192,422.46 1.72 139,633.03 1.59 47 0.02 
Gambella 10,342.12 0.09 10,057.29 0.11 
 Crop seed types not request from regions 21,521 8.37 
Source: CSA (2008) and MoARD (2008b)
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farmers, seeds that are in shortage, such as hybrid maize, 
are allocated to select farmers. The selection of farmers 
who will get the seed is made by the development agents 
in close consultation with the kebele administration.
The distribution of certified seed used to be under-
taken through credit along with fertiliser as a package. 
In recent years, however, the distribution is totally 
through cash payment. The shift in the mode of distribu-
tion was generally due to the considerable amount of 
defaults by farmers, which was putting considerable 
number of primary cooperatives in financial crises. 
With all its advantages, this type of planned distribu-
tion system seems to hinder the different seed companies 
to invest in distribution channels and retail outlets, which 
could contribute in improving the efficiency of the 
system. The main advantage of this system to seed 
companies is that the whole marketing risks are trans-
ferred from the seed companies to the distributors (coop-
eratives), whereas the disadvantages are related with 
the limitation of seed companies to benefit more from 
branding and quality premium. 
6.4.4. Actors and process of price setting of certified 
seed
Figure 5 presents the interaction of different actors in 
the process of price setting for certified seed. The core 
decision on seed prices is made by the board of directors 
of Ethiopian Seed Enterprise (ESE), which is composed 
of the Director General of EIAR as chair, two ESE repre-
sentatives, Director of Agricultural Extension, Director 
of the Agricultural Marketing, and Director of the 
Planning and M&E Directorates of MoARD as members. 
The set price is then communicated to the Agricultural 
Marketing Directorate (AMD) of MoARD. The AMD gives 
a direction on the price setting mechanism and commu-
nicates along with the amount appropriated and 
purchase price to regional agricultural marketing depart-
ment of the respective regions. 
The private seed companies are asked for their offer 
price and the price is set through negotiation with 
regional BoARD. The different cooperative unions 
purchase the certified seeds at these different prices from 
both public and private seed companies. The highest 
price is normally offered by private seed companies that 
have their own parental lines (those who produce their 
own basic seed). The 2009 prices ranged from 988.55 for 
ESE to 1936 ETB/quintal for Pioneer Hi Bred hybrid maize. 
The prices of cereal seeds are similar whether they are 
sourced from public or private seed company except the 
difference due to overhead, transportation and profit 
margins of the different unions and primary cooperatives. 
The profit margins are determined by the AMD of BoARD 
within the respective regions and varying slightly across 
regions. For instance, the profit margin for cooperative 
unions in Amhara is about 5 ETB/quintal, whereas it is 
2.50 ETB/quintal in Oromiya. Similarly, the profit margin 
for primary cooperatives is 6.00 ETB/quintal in Amhara 
and it ranges from 2.50 to 3.00 ETB/quintal in Oromiya. 
In general, the selling price of hybrid maize was within 
the range of 1100 – 1300 ETB/quintal. 
The current price setting mechanism has both advan-
tages and disadvantages. The advantages are (i) it limits 
the entrance of excess intermediaries in the market, 
which helps farmers to get seed at reasonably better 
prices, (ii) it enables farmers with limited access to 
markets (those in distant areas with poor road) to 
purchase seed equitably, and (iii) it promotes group 
marketing especially through membership in coopera-
tives, The disadvantages are: (i) it transfers the cost 
incurred due to the inefficiency of union and primary 
cooperatives to farmers, (ii) it limits the competitions 
among the different seed producers, (iii) it creates disin-
centive for seed producers to work and invest on their 
own distribution systems, and (iv) it is liable to corruption 
and promotes black market for seed.
In the 2009 production season, the price of hybrid 
maize in the black market was more than 5000 birr/quin-
tals, which gave the different maize seed market actors 
and others outside of the seed system an incentive to 
join the black market and not comply with their respec-
tive contracts. Thus, the price setting mechanism seems 
to shift the economic benefit created due to the rift 
between demand and supply from those who are in the 
seed system to other actors outside the system, limiting 
the possibility of increased investment by the actors in 
the system.
6.4.5. Actors, decisions and linkages in a partial-
liberalised cereal seed system 
There has been much discussion about the liberalisation 
and reform in the agricultural sector. Consequentially, 
the government of Ethiopia has been implementing a 
series of policies mainly seeking to generate: (i) a more 
supportive macroeconomic framework; (ii) liberalised 
markets for agricultural products; and (iii) a strong exten-
sion- and credit-led push for intensification of food 
staples production through the use of modern inputs, 
especially seed and fertiliser (Byerlee et al. 2007; Jayne 
et al. 2002), as there has been limited progress to liberalise 
the input sector. As a nationally strategic sector, main-
tenance of control over production and food security is 
seen as an important priority. 
The multitude of notionally private organisations are 
strongly influenced by the state through direct involve-
ment and broader regulation. This has forced the private 
sector in the seed system to operate marginally, which 
has resulted in limited private investment, unavailability 
of retail networks, and above all limited option for the 
farmers to access demanded seed at the required time 
and volume. Liberalisation is thus partial, yet at the same 
time centralised state control is not complete. 
Partial liberalisation is particularly the case because 
of the decentralisation of state functions, and the more 
flexible and heterogeneous arrangements found in the 
regions. For instance, some regions, like Amhara, have 
distributed the basic seed of hybrid maize allocated for 
the region to some of the private seed companies, which 
was not the case in other regions. Thus there is a wide 
range of interpretations of federal level regulations in 
the regions, and a range of activities that are not always 
formally sanctioned. Here policy in practice means a 
much more varied response, with a variety of innovations, 
usually from private sector players operating at the 
margins. 
This uneven liberalisation as mediated through the 
particular form of Ethiopian political –administrative 
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decentralisation and intent of creating a decentralised 
seed system has a number of consequences. This results 
in some severe bottlenecks and constraints in the seed 
system. These include:
 • the weak overall coordination of the different actors 
of the national research system (EIAR, RARIs, and AHLIs) 
for effective utilisation of both human and physical 
research resources
 • limited uptake of released varieties, partially a result 
of the limited demonstration and popularisation of 
the varieties to relevant stakeholders including farmers 
and extension workers
 • the lack of coordination and synchronisation mecha-
nisms for activities among ESE, OSE and ASE implies 
the need for strong national coordination and synchro-
nisation of seed production and marketing activities 
for efficiency and creation of synergy and avoidance 
of the expected unnecessary competition of among 
these actors for the same resource like facilities, human 
resources, and markets.
 • the priority given to the Crash Seed Multiplication 
Program (CSMP) in basic seed allocation seems to 
crowd out the private seed companies from the 
involvement in certified hybrid maize seed production 
eroding the trust between the private and public 
sectors and long term investment in the systems
 • the planned distribution system seems to hinder the 
different seed companies to invest in distribution chan-
nels and retail outlets, which could contribute in 
improving the efficiency of the system
 • the seed pricing mechanism, which is not based on 
supply and demand seems to the real economic incen-
tive to actors not involved in the seed system, thus 
draining the resources that can be invested back in 
the system. 
7.The economic and political 
drivers of the Ethiopian 
cereal seed system
The analysis of actors, linkages and policies presented 
above has identified a number of constraints faced by 
the Ethiopian cereal seed system. These are the result of 
a number of core economic and political drivers. Three 
drivers pull in different directions: these are top-down 
state driven initiatives; agricultural liberalisation and the 
pr ivate  sec tor  and pol i t ica l -administrat ive 
decentralisation. 
7.1. Driver 1: Top-down, state-driven 
initiatives
With agricultural production and food security so high 
up on the political agenda, at present, perhaps the main 
driver in the seed systems of the country is related to the 
political decisions to increase and sustain the agricultural 
growth that has been achieved in the last five years, 
where the sector has been growing more than 10 percent 
annually. The result has been a series of top-down initia-
tives coming from federal level and supported at the 
highest political levels. These highlight the importance 
of technical and institutional change – and the central 
role of improved seeds in this. A major effort has revolved 
around ‘Agricultural Technology Scaling up’ as part of 
the national initiative of ’scaling up of best practices’, 
which includes wider dissemination of already available 
agricultural technologies (mainly improved crop varieties 
and fertiliser) and continuous packaging and validation 
of technologies; promoting the involvement of the 
private sector, and working together with donors and 
development partners. 
Along with the scaling up of best practices policy, there 
is a strong commitment that such activities should have 
political leadership. Thus, starting from the 2008/09 
Figure 5. Actors and their role in seed price setting
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production season, top policy makers at all levels (federal, 
regional, zonal, woreda and kebele) are given as their 
number one responsibility in promoting the scaling up 
of best practices in the agricultural sectors the priority 
to ensure that improved technologies (in particular, seeds 
and fertiliser) reach farmers. This form of ‘command agri-
culture’, linked to centrally-defined targets, is embedded 
in the evaluation criteria for government officials, and 
in turn linked to budget allocations and performance 
assessments. With such strong political backing this 
becomes perhaps the number one driver of the seed 
system. Directed by and through the central state, it 
reinforces state control over the agricultural system, and 
acts to pull into line regional differences and diversity in 
a centrally managed planning system. 
7.2. Driver 2: The private sector
As discussed above the Ethiopian government has long 
had a commitment to boosting the role of the private 
sector in agriculture (FDRE 2006). Along with the public 
strategy in promoting private sector, different incentives 
are provided to support the private seed companies 
either through the overall investment incentives and/or 
seed sector specific support. These incentives are related 
with better access to land, duty-free import of capital 
goods, grace periods of up to five years on land rents, 
and tax holidays (MoTI 2007). In addition, the government 
is supporting the organisation of the private seed compa-
nies to better voice their interests. Now, the Ethiopian 
Seed Growers and Processors’ Association is functional. 
Though still weak, the association is improving the 
engagement of emerging private seed companies in the 
system.
While the private sector is growing it remains poorly 
integrated into the national seed production and distri-
butions system and focuses only on particular seeds, i.e. 
hybrid maize in some regions. Under the current setup, 
all private seed companies, except the multinational 
private seed company, are dependent on the public 
supply of source seed (basic seed) and also have to align 
to the public distribution system. Even the currently 
licensed private seed companies who own parental lines 
for the popular hybrid maize varieties appear to remain 
aligned to the public distribution channels and pricing 
mechanism. This has created a disincentive for the private 
seed companies to invest in distribution channels and 
market outlets. This discouragement also seems the core 
reason for lack of seed shops and retail outlets in Ethiopia 
which are often found in other East African countries. 
The only multinational seed company operating in 
Ethiopia is Pioneer Hi Bred Ethiopia, which has its own 
source seed and some distribution network. The major 
issue preventing increased participation of multina-
tionals in the Ethiopian seed system is the financial regu-
lation that limits the repatriation of foreign currency out 
of the country. This legislation has created a disincentive 
for most of multinationals interested to become involved 
in the country’s seed system.
In terms of the overall narratives of policy, the role of 
the private sector and the importance of liberalisation 
attract much attention, even though the actual influence 
the private sector has in seed policy circles in Ethiopia 
remains weak. The emerging private seed companies 
are constrained by publicly-dictated source seed supply, 
limited business opportunity in participating in OPV seed 
production due to low demand, and semi-liberalised seed 
markets. Thus in practice, despite much profile, the 
private sector driver remains weak and fragmented, and 
state interests – particularly those which are centrally 
directed with a strong political push – continue to domi-
nate the formal seed sector.
7.3. Driver 3: The decentralised political-
administrative system 
Constitutionally, Ethiopia has a strong commitment to 
a decentralised political-administrative system. This 
means the agricultural and rural development efforts 
are decentralised to the respective regional states under 
the general national policy framework. As indicated 
above, along with the decentralisation of the political 
system, the seed system in the country is also becoming 
decentralised following the emergence of Regional 
Agricultural Research Institutes (RARIs) in late 1990s and 
Regional Seed Enterprises (RSEs) in early 2009, where 
the role of ESE as a sole public seed enterprise is ceasing. 
Two regional Seed Enterprises, namely the Oromiya Seed 
Enterprise (OSE) and Amhara Seed Enterprise (ASE) were 
established by their respective regional governments in 
December 2009. SNNPR also established the South Seed 
Enterprise in early 2010, and is currently in the prepara-
tory phase. There only appears to be political will to have 
three Regional Seed Enterprises i.e. in Oromiya (OSE), 
Amhara (ASE), and in SNNPR (SSE) because of the scale 
seed production in those areas. 
The experience so far shows that the decentralisation 
of the seed system has both opportunities and challenges 
on the national seed system. The opportunities are 
related to: (i) better research coverage the different agro-
ecologies; (ii) improved possibility of expanding the 
production and marketing of seed for all crops; (iii) 
improving the human and physical capacity at regional 
level, (iv) improving the possibility of producing locally 
demanded crop varieties, and (v) the possibility of 
marketing at relatively lower cost due to reduced cost 
of transportation. The challenges are related to: (i) the 
need for strong national coordination  of agricultural 
research and development, seed production and 
marketing activities for better efficiency and creation of 
institutional synergies; (ii) avoiding unnecessary compe-
tition among the three regional seed enterprises for the 
same resources, such as facilities, human resources and 
markets; and (iii) if the regional seed enterprises are to 
serve only their respective regions, the role of ESE will 
need to be redefined as a national seed enterprise.
Similarly, as stated in section 5, the country has a 
decentralised national agricultural research system 
(NARS) involving EIAR, RARIs and AHLIs. Even though 
the decentralisation will boost the capacity of the NARS 
in covering Ethiopia’s diverse agro-ecology, the system 
requires alignment and coordination among the different 
actors for efficient utilisation of the meagre human and 
physical resources the country possesses.  Although, the 
proclamations for the establishment of EIAR and RARIs 
set out their respective mandates and an agreement on 
the coordination modalities by establishing National 
Agricultural Coordination Council with a secretariat and 
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were established in April 2010, the precise roles and 
responsibilities of federal and regional research are still 
being debated. 
8. The political economy of 
cereal seed systems in 
Ethiopia
The constraints of designing effective, centrally deter-
mined, special purpose programmes in developing 
countries are legendary. Depending on the circum-
stances, however, either centralised or decentralised 
approaches for reaching the poor can be adopted. The 
experiences in China with effective local programmes 
and Mexico with central government programs, both 
demonstrate successes even though considerable chal-
lenges and difficulties continue in both cases (Ahmad 
2009). 
Over many years, Ethiopia’s agricultural policy frame-
work has been dominated by a top-down, centrally 
designed, state-directed approach. This has been contin-
uous from the Imperial regime, through the Derg, and 
to the current political setting. Whether the integrated 
rural development programmes of the 1960s, the 
package programmes of the 1970s, the villagisation 
efforts of the 1980s or the input supply programmes led 
by Sasakawa Global 2000 of the 1990s, all have seen a 
central role for the state in directing rural development, 
organising delivery and supplying technology. This 
remains the case today, with added challenges due to 
the decentralisation of the political and economic deci-
sion processes, and  especially since 2001/02 when the 
government’s decentralisation process was carried 
further to the woreda (district) level (Spielman et al. 2009). 
The recent Crash Seed Multiplication Programme 
(CSMP) is among the prime examples of such centrally-
directed efforts, which, in the context of the current 
setting, reveals tensions that can affect the way such 
programmes unfold in practice. While such politically-
directed centralised initiatives are informed by technical 
expertise, such technical designs are sometimes over-
shadowed by political imperatives, creating tensions 
between the technocracy and the political system. 
Since 2008, centralised approaches like CSMP have 
also come into tension with the decentralised political-
administrative system and the decentralised seed system. 
While highly controlled in many ways (centrally set 
targets, central appropriation of source seeds etc), there 
remains room for manoeuvre within the regional system, 
with bureaus of agriculture and local regional politicians 
having some important areas of autonomy (like setting 
regional targets, independent planning for established 
regional seed enterprises, etc) . Thus, parallel efforts may 
emerge with federal and regional state level initiatives 
running side by side. 
Finally, tensions exist between the state and the emer-
gent private sector. While there has been much policy 
rhetoric about the benefits of liberalisation in Ethiopia 
(UNCTD 2002), the state retains a strong hold over market 
actors, either through market disincentives (e.g. price 
setting) or limiting certain operations (e.g. distribution). 
Again, the argument of the strategic importance of food 
and agriculture and the perceived weak presence of the 
private sector is deployed to argue for strong state 
control, even in notionally privatised operations. 
On the other front, the donors’ support through like 
PASS, the Program for Africa’s Seed System of the Alliance 
for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA), an initiative of 
the Bill & Melinda Gates and Rockefeller Foundations, 
AGP, the Agricultural Growth Program of the World Bank 
and the East and Central Africa initiative to harmonize 
the respective seed policies are also playing important 
role in the process creating vibrant seed system in the 
country.
In the last two decades a strong central political lead-
ership committed to growth through agricultural produc-
tivity has pushed a certain line which argues for a green 
revolution generated by state initiative, supported, in 
carefully controlled ways, by a partially liberalised private 
sector. This includes the development of high-yielding 
varieties of cereal grains, expansion of irrigation infra-
structure, and distribution of hybrid seeds, synthetic 
fertilisers and pesticides to farmers. It is argued that this 
public-private arrangement is the most effective way of 
stimulating a green revolution, and ensuring broad-
based agriculture led growth (MoFED 2006). 
But there are limits to this very particular vision of an 
‘Ethiopian Green Revolution’. For example, in recent years 
following a number of major state-led efforts that have 
mobilised researchers, civil servants and regional officials 
across the country5 , it was realised that there was a 
serious shortage of improved technologies, especially 
seed. The supply shortages arise from the limited capacity 
of both public and private seed producers and suppliers. 
Moreover, there is weak coordination and linkages 
among actors in the system for seed development, 
production, multiplication and distribution. Yet it is clear 
that highly productive technologies require intensive 
and effective mechanisms for complex coordination and 
exchange, to allow investment in and operation of 
different specialised activities. These mechanisms in turn 
require an effective institutional environment to govern 
them (Dorward et al. 2005). Currently, however, there is 
no workable national action plan for seed multiplication 
in Ethiopia. The seed quality control system as well as 
the distribution of breeder, pre-basic and basic seed by 
NARS are uncoordinated. Furthermore, there is inefficient 
demonstration and popularisation of newly released 
varieties by the national public system. Contracts are 
also poorly enforced within the system, especially those 
contractual agreements between the public sector and 
private seed companies, ESE and seed producing farmers, 
and seed companies and seed multiplying farms. 
The problems with a green revolution vision are also 
exacerbated by the limited production and storage 
capacity the public seed companies, and the perfor-
mance of the private seed companies.  The public 
Ethiopian Seed Enterprise (ESE) has an insufficient avail-
ability of irrigable land and use of irrigation in seed 
production which results in a limited supply of seed 
especially during the Belg season.6  The private seed 
companies focus only on hybrid seed, especially hybrid 
maize, where there is a sizeable demand and an oppor-
tunity to turn a profit. The existence of leftover basic seed 
by some private companies and the sale of seed through 
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black market by underreporting the amount of seed 
produced also hinder the green revolution vision. 
The prevailing critical shortage of seed has therefore 
attracted the attention and created an opportunity for 
policy makers and others at different levels to gain a 
better understanding of the challenges and opportuni-
ties in the seed system. This is driving new policy changes 
and also the involvement of different actors. The limits 
of centrally-directed, state-led planning have been 
realised, and the importance of private sector actors has 
been recognised by both state and non-state actors alike. 
This has led to important recent changes in policy and 
practice related to licensing out of basic seed multiplica-
tion to both public and private seed companies, expan-
sion of the seed production capacity of public seed 
enterprises, and the promotion of specialisation in the 
production of the different classes of seed.
The Crash Seed Multiplication Programme (CSMP) has 
emerged out of these policy shifts and the growing 
awareness of the need to accelerate the production and 
distribution of cereal seeds across the country. In the 
short run, it aims to contribute to reducing the critical 
shortage of certified hybrid maize. However, it is unlikely 
to have any lasting impact on the emergence of a vibrant 
seed system in the long run. The CSMP will not address 
the main challenge of the seed system, as it does not 
allow farmers to have a choice of different varieties of 
crop seeds.  CSMP also crowds out the emerging private 
sector, which is mainly involved in production of certified 
hybrid maize due to limited access to basic seeds. The 
resources mobilised for the CSMP could have been 
utilized in creating vibrant seed system through human 
and physical capacity building of the ESE, the emerging 
regional seed enterprises, the Seed Quality and Inspection 
Laboratories (SQIL) as well as the Animal and Plant Health 
Regulatory Directorate (APHRD) at federal and processes 
at the respective regional levels.
In support of the new direction for policy, a number 
of other measures have also been initiated. These include, 
firstly, the licensing of basic seed production of hybrid 
maize. This is really a unique measure in strengthening 
the multiplication of certified hybrid maize seed in a 
sustainable manner. The hybrid varieties were developed 
by the public research institute and those licensed private 
companies get the parental line almost for free. This 
measure is expected to considerably improve the supply 
of basic seed for hybrid maize in a sustainable manner.
Secondly there has been an expansion of seed produc-
tion capacity in public seed enterprises. The seed produc-
tion capacity of ESE is planned to increase from about 
200,000 quintals of seed in 2008/09 production season 
to about 800,000 quintals in 2010/11 through the addi-
tional farms and expansion of contractual arrangement 
with different organisations like universities, schools, 
state farmers and also private commercial farmers. 
Similarly, the OSE and ASE are producing seed on their 
own farms and also through contractual arrangement 
on other farms.
Third, there has been promotion of Farmers-Based 
Seed Production and Marketing Schemes (FBSPMS). 
Currently, the ESE in collaboration with the respective 
regional BoARD is implementing the schemes. The newly 
established seed enterprises are also following suit in 
promoting seed production mainly for OPV crop varieties 
through a similar scheme. These schemes improve the 
possibility of seed production of locally demanded vari-
eties and crops for which there is less commercial interest. 
There is also an increased possibility of producing and 
marketing seed within communities that will reduce cost 
seed purchase (Sahlu et al. 2008). Production sites can 
also serve as demonstration sites, thereby possibly 
enhancing the adoption of crop varieties. FBSPMS have 
several advantages which can improve seed production 
and adoption rates. 
Overall, there has been a policy emphasis on the 
specialisation in the production of different classes of 
seed. To help improve supply, there has been greater 
strategic focus given to the role of public seed enterprises 
in supporting the multiplication of basic seeds for openly 
pollinated varieties (OPV) and certified hybrid maize on 
their own farm and to promote certified seed production 
through Farmers-Based Seed Production and Marketing 
Schemes (FBSPMS) and contracting with commercial 
farms for different classes of seed. On the other hand, 
the different research institutes to focus on the multipli-
cation of breeder and pre-basic seed along with basic 
seed for hybrid crops.
In summary, a major driver of the seed system has 
been the political economy of hunger and poverty in 
the country. This has focused considerable political atten-
tion at the highest levels of government on increasing 
economic growth and food security through improved 
agricultural productivity, with seeds playing a central 
role in that agenda. This increased political commitment 
has resulted in a number of centrally directed research 
and development programmes to improve, multiply and 
distribute new cereal seed varieties, largely focused on 
state institutions for delivery from regional to woreda 
levels. To date, these programmes have had a limited 
impact due to the lack of availability of high quality seed. 
However, the state’s capacity – increasingly in alliance 
with farmer-led initiatives, especially multiplication 
programmes – has been boosted through new invest-
ments and policy efforts from the state and highly influ-
ential global philanthropic institutions (e.g., Gates and 
Rockefeller Foundation through PASS AGRA) and multi-
lateral donors (e.g. World Bank through AGR). While much 
of this should be welcomed, inappropriate public 
research and a growing dominance of the state and 
certain non-state actors – in practice and in culture – 
means that there could be a narrowing of research priori-
ties and potentially ‘lock-in’ to a limited set of technological 
solutions serving particular interests to the exclusion of 
others. Technology pathways in Ethiopia are increasingly 
being fashioned by global funding and special interests, 
sometimes resulting in a lack of involvement of wider 
stakeholders. Thus, there is a danger that the diverse 
livelihood pathways and associated agricultural tech-
nology demands of the country’s millions of smallholder 
farmers may not be served by these new arrangements 
for agricultural innovation.
While new investments are made and programmes 
are adjusted, the high political profile of such efforts 
sometimes means that politics overshadows technical 
analysis. For this reason, continuous monitoring and 
evaluation and greater transparency and accountability 
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are required so that appropriate solutions can be found. 
But this will require greater willingness to collect and 
share high-quality data and institute performance and 
impact assessment procedures than is apparent at 
present. 
Events that occurred in previous years have created 
a hidden mistrust between the public and private sector 
engaged in the seed system. These include the sale of 
grain maize treated with chemicals and packed in labelled 
bag as hybrid maize seed; under reporting of the 
produced certified hybrid maize seed and participation 
in the black market; reported theft of labelled seed bags 
of certified seed producers are all issues that have created 
mistrust on the private sector by the governments. 
Whereas the private sector mistrusts the government 
due to the limited provision of basic hybrid maize seed, 
and primary concern is the trend in crowding out of the 
private seed producers through the strengthened 
engagement of the public seed producers in situations 
where the private companies have a commercial interest. 
Experiences from other developing countries show 
that there are clearly defined roles in the seed production 
for the public and private seed producers (Muhammad 
et al. 2003). In general, the public sector engages in the 
production of seed of crop varieties for which there is 
limited commercial interest for the private sector. In the 
Ethiopia context, private seed companies are exclusively 
engaged in hybrid maize production by sourcing the 
basic seed from the public sector. However the public 
sector, through ESE and regional seed enterprises, is also 
a key player in hybrid seed production. Even though the 
current level of participation of the private seed compa-
nies is limited taking into consideration the huge national 
demand, precaution needs to be taken not to crowd out 
the engagement of the private sector.
In this regard, the Ethiopian Seed Growers and 
Processors’ Association (ESGPA) needs to find ways to 
build greater awareness and trust through promotion 
of member discipline, working closely with the relevant 
public organisations for better understanding of the role 
of the private seed companies. The ESGPA must also 
address infighting among its fellow members, who some-
times pursue a ‘hit-and-run’ approach to the production 
and marketing of seed, which only serves to tarnish the 
reputation of all players in the seed sector.
9. Conclusions 
The percentage of land planted under formal seeds in 
Ethiopia is very modest, covering only 4.3 percent of the 
arable area in 2008, with considerable variability among 
different crops (NSPDC 2009). Nevertheless, although 
the formal sector represents a relatively small proportion 
of the national seed system in the country, it exerts 
considerable influence over the rest of the system. In 
particular, it plays an increasingly important role in 
producing and distributing improved seed for a number 
of strategically important cereal crops, especially wheat 
and maize (where it provides 80 percent of hybrid maize). 
The historical origins of the current top-down, centrally 
designed state-directed approach to seed production 
and distribution can be traced from the Imperial regime 
through the Derg period to the current political setting. 
In all modern political eras, the Ethiopian cereal seed 
system has followed the same approach, with the public 
sector dominating the formal seed system. The principal 
target of the system was to serve the needs of large-scale 
state farms and farmers’ cooperatives and fill the gap left 
by a weak private sector. This bias is still influencing 
overall policy and planning within the national seed 
system. 
Recently, the type and number of actors in the 
Ethiopian formal seed system in general and cereal seed 
system in particular have been changing following the 
introduction of new  institutional and policy changes in 
the system. These have been brought about by a combi-
nation of political concerns about addressing widespread 
hunger and food insecurity, stimulating agricultural-led 
growth and investing in infrastructure and technical 
capacity with the aid of international donors. At present, 
the formal seed sector comprises the National Agricultural 
Research System (NARS), public and private seed 
producers, seed distributors and regulators. 
The Ethiopian seed sector is governed by policies 
stipulated in the different public proclamations and 
regulations that were put in place since the early 1990s. 
The main responsibility of implementing these policies 
has been with MoARD at the federal level and to BoARD 
at the regional level. Overall, the main targets of the poli-
cies are related with: (i) streamlining evaluation, release, 
registration and maintenance of varieties developed by 
the National Agricultural Research System ; (ii) developing 
an effective seed production and supply system through 
participation of public and private actors; (iii) encour-
aging the participation of farmers in germplasm conser-
vation and seed production; (iv) creating functional and 
efficient institutional linkages among seed industry 
development players; and (v) regulation of seed quality, 
seed import-export trade, quarantine and other seed 
related issues.
 As indicated above, across each of the elements of 
the seed system – from breeding, to source seed main-
tenance and multiplication, to basic seed and certified 
seed production and distribution to price setting - a wide 
range of actors are involved. These are dominated by the 
state which has the mandate for production and distribu-
tion as well as regulation. The private sector is encour-
aged to play a more active role in the system, but in 
reality its efforts have been fairly circumscribed due to 
market disincentives or limitation of certain 
operations.
The analysis carried out for this study shows that there 
are three key drivers of the political economy of the seed 
system in Ethiopia, which are integrated considerably 
affect the way seed policy and implementation guide-
lines are played out. These are: (i) the top-down state-
driven initiatives; (ii) the policy intent of private sector 
promotion associated with liberalisation of the economy; 
and (iii) the challenges and opportunities associated with 
the decentralised political administration and, with it, a 
decentralised seed system.
These ‘pull-push’ factors have brought about severe 
strains within the system. Tensions exist between the 
technocracy and the political system due to the fact that 
technical designs are sometimes overshadowed by 
political imperatives, sometimes misdirecting priorities 
and investments away from the people and places that 
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need them the most. Centralised approaches have also 
come into conflict with the decentralised political-admin-
istrative system which has sought to promote a decen-
tralised seed system, in part due to the emergence of 
parallel federal and regional state level seed R&D initia-
tives running side by side. These have led to duplication 
of effort, wasting of limited resources and unnecessary 
turf battles. Finally, tensions exist between the state and 
the emergent private sector as the state seeks to liberalise 
the sector while retaining a strong hold over the market, 
failing to recognise the contradiction of trying to have 
it both ways at once. 
Thus, it is important that the technocrats, politicians 
and their international donors and supporters under-
stand these political economic drivers of change in the 
Ethiopian cereal seed system. By addressing these 
conflicts and contradictions, they may improve their 
chances of designing and implementing more technically 
effective and socially appropriate policies and help estab-
lish a vibrant seed system that offers real choices for 
farmers in terms of seed type, quantity, and quality and 
delivery time at reasonable prices.
End Notes
1 CSA (2009) estimated that the total number of 
agricultural households is 13,943,372, which shows that 
almost all smallholder holder farmers are engaged in 
production of one or more types of cereal crops
2 There is no standard yet for QDS
3 A woreda is an administrative division of Ethiopia 
(managed by a local government), equivalent to a 
district
4 A kebele is the smallest administrative unit of Ethiopia 
similar to ward, a neighbourhood or a localised and 
delimited group of people. Sometimes referred to as a 
peasant association, it is part of a woreda or district.
5 This efforts are mainly related with the interventions 
related with the implementation of the government 
directive ’scaling up of best practices’
6 There are three main seasons in Ethiopia; from 
September to February is the long dry season known as 
the Bega. This is followed by a short rainy season, the 
Belg, in March and April. May is a hot and dry month 
preceding the Kremt the long rainy season in June, July 
and August. The kremt season, under normal 
circumstance, is a primary source of rainfall for 
significant parts of the country.
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